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Policy Messages:  Declining soil fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa threatens crop production, 
the major economic activity for many people. Improving the supply of fertilizer and expanding 
the opportunities for more productive fertilizer use will create broad-based gains in well-being. 
 
•  Most studies agree on the investments needed to establish appropriate “enabling conditions” 
to stimulate fertilizer demand and supply, and on giving priority to these investments over 
short-run fertilizer promotion programs and subsidies, whose value is vigorously debated 
•  Among the six categories of fertilizer promotion programs identified by the study, most 
include direct or indirect subsidies, and none have lived up to expectations fully.  
•  For economic or social reasons, fertilizer subsidies are usually intended to benefit small 
farmers, but much of the subsidy is often captured by others. Subsidies may also undercut 
commercial sales and discourage expansion by private traders, they are hard to sustain budg-
etarily, and they have less real development impact per dollar than other public investments. 
•  Because policy makers must address political and social goals, the desirability of alternative 
fertilizer investments should be evaluated using a broad perspective that considers these 
goals in addition to financial, economic, and environmental objectives. 
•  Policy and program choices must be based on systematic, empirical evaluation of the private 
and social costs and benefits at both the local and national levels. 
 
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: 
The advent of the new millennium found 
African policy makers facing a barrage of 
reports suggesting that soil quality decline 
was approaching crisis dimensions. It is 
generally agreed that the improvements in 
soil fertility needed to stimulate agricul-
tural productivity and rural income growth 
and improve food security will require 
substantial increases in fertilizer use (both 
organic and inorganic) together with 
improved land husbandry practices. 
Despite increases in some countries, the 
average intensity of fertilizer use in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) remains much lower 
than elsewhere (roughly 9 kilograms per 
hectare versus 86 kg/ha in Latin America, 
104 kg/ha in South Asia, and 142 kg/ha in 
Southeast Asia). A key question is how 
government policies and programs should 
be designed to achieve the substantial 
increases in fertilizer use that are needed. 
 
This paper outlines the role of improved 
soil fertility in the process of structural 
transformation, and examines specific 
financial, economic, social, and political 
arguments in favor of promoting increased 
fertilizer use, particularly in smallholder 
farming systems. The paper draws experi-
ences and insights from the literature on 
which policies and programs appear to 
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ing a sustainable increase in fertilizer use 
by small farmers. Special attention is given 
to addressing the question of fertilizer 
subsidies: Under what circumstances are 
they warranted and what form should they 
take, if and when they are implemented? 
 
Using a benefit/cost framework for 
fertilizer policy analysis. The fertilizer 
policy problem is to choose the most cost-
effective set of investments for achieving 
an agreed upon set of objectives, given 
available public funds. While most would 
accept this general statement, controversy 
arises in defining the objectives and in 
quantifying the potential for different 
investments or policy changes to attain 
these objectives. Input promotion pro-
grams typically have multiple objectives 
that reflect financial, economic, environ-
mental, social, or political goals. 
 
A broad analytical perspective should be 
used in assessing the requirements and the 
impacts of alternative interventions. This 
implies taking into account dynamic and 
partial equilibrium effects, and addressing 
social, political, agronomic, and environ-
mental as well as economic dimensions of 
the issue. Impacts should be valued using 
economic prices (reflecting opportunity 
costs), not just financial prices (which may 
be affected by taxes or subsidies). This 
distinction is familiar to many, but is not 
always clearly maintained in discussions 
of input programs. Assumptions about the 
“counterfactual” (what would have hap-
pened without the input program) must be 
made explicit since that determines the 
baseline against which the incremental 
impact is measured.  
 
Typology of fertilizer promotion pro-
grams. Fertilizer promotion has been 
pursued through programs that directly 
stimulate fertilizer use or that improve the 
enabling conditions for fertilizer use (e.g., 
policy and institutional reforms that 
improve market performance). Six catego-
ries of fertilizer promotion programs have 
been popular in SSA: 
 
1.  Controlled state input distribution 
programs. Through an integrated sys-
tem of input and output markets, the 
state distributes fertilizer and other in-
puts to farmers (often on credit) and 
attempts to recoup the input costs at 
harvest time.  
2.  Targeted government input distribu-
tion programs in an open market. 
Public sector fertilizer distribution 
plays a more limited and financially 
sustainable role, by targeting input 
subsidies to selected farmers while al-
lowing private sector input distribution 
on commercial terms.  
3.  Sasakawa/Global 2000 programs. 
SG-2000 programs in the 1990s sup-
ported half-hectare demonstration 
plots, often in productive areas, where 
farmers were supplied with credit, im-
proved inputs, and extension advice. 
4.  Outgrower or cooperative programs 
with interlinked input-credit-output 
market transactions. An outgrower 
company or cooperative (e.g., for cof-
fee, cotton, or sugar) links seasonal 
finance, input delivery and output 
marketing, similar to (1) above.  
5.  Public sector facilitation of private 
sector fertilizer supply. Public in-
vestments, e.g., in market and transport 
infrastructure, are made to support ex-
panded private sector involvement in 
fertilizer marketing to small farmers. 
6.  Starter pack programs (Malawi). 
With food security and safety net ob-
jectives, this program initially provided 
almost every small farm household 
with a free “pack” of fertilizer and im-
proved maize and legume seed suffi-
cient for cultivation of 0.1 hectares. 
 
SUBSIDIES: Fertilizer subsidies can 
differ in terms of (1) the point at which the 
subsidy is applied (farmer, trader, domes-
tic fertilizer producer); (2) the form of the 
subsidy, or how it is provided (cash 
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price, transport subsidy); and (3) related to 
the above, whether the subsidy is direct 
(fertilizer price reduced), or indirect 
(through subsidized credit, for example). 
 
Arguments in favor of fertilizer subsidies 
fall into three categories: 
•  Financial. Increased agricultural 
output or incomes (for farmers and 
traders) are valued using prevailing 
(i.e., financial) prices, without neces-
sarily making an explicit case that the 
efficiency losses from the subsidy are 
offset by the output/income gains. 
•  Economic. Subsidies are expected to 
create real economic gains by (a) 
“kick-starting” a process of innovation, 
e.g., through credit to overcome liquid-
ity constraints, so that agricultural pro-
ductivity rises in the medium to long 
term or (b) correcting for missing or 
imperfect input and output markets. 
•  Non-economic. Subsidies are expected 
to help restore soil fertility, improve 
food security, alleviate poverty, and 
provide social and environmental pro-
tection—all objectives whose eco-
nomic impacts are difficult to quantify. 
 
Arguments against fertilizer subsidies 
most often stress the following problems: 
•  Misallocation of scarce resources: 
stimulation of fertilizer use where it is 
not economically profitable, and/or 
diversion of scarce public resources 
from other productivity-enhancing in-
vestments that promise higher or 
longer-lasting payoffs. 
•  Ineffective targeting: the beneficiaries 
are supposed to be poor farmers but 
some fertilizer leaks out to others and 
elites may capture much of the benefit. 
•  Market disruptions: unpredictable 
changes in subsidy programs, which 
discourage private sector investment; 
price control and rationing, which en-
courage rent-seeking behavior; politi-
cal interference; and unfair competi-
tion between state-run and private sec-
tor enterprises. Such effects can un-
dermine the development of commer-
cial fertilizer marketing networks to 
serve small farmers. 
 
Alternatives to subsidies. A large number 
of policies and investments have been 
suggested as alternatives to subsidies in 
order to reduce the cost of fertilizer and to 
improve its effect on yields:  
•  Improving enabling conditions by 
promoting policies and institutions that 
contribute to efficient markets for in-
puts, financial services, and outputs. 
•  Reducing the high costs of transporta-
tion, e.g., costs of handling and port 
clearance and poor road quality. 
•  Reducing taxation on agriculture. 
•  Investing in agricultural research, 
extension, and rural education. 
 
CONCLUSIONS:  The literature on 
agricultural development and soil fertility 
reflects a variety of perspectives or objec-
tives, depending on the training, experi-
ence, and occupational position of each 
author. The literature shows reasonable 
agreement on strategic measures to estab-
lish appropriate enabling conditions. It is 
argued that rapid growth in fertilizer use 
will require (a) increased investment in 
transportation and marketing infrastructure 
to stimulate private sector growth, drive 
down the costs of fertilizer and improve 
farmer output prices so that fertilizer use 
becomes more profitable for farmers; (b) 
the generation and diffusion of improved 
seeds that are more responsive to fertilizer 
application; (c) better extension services 
and extension messages that can improve 
small farmers’ ability to use fertilizer 
profitably; (d) cost-effective means of 
reducing the risks of using fertilizer and 
producing for the market; (e) greater 
attention to institutional development 
(improved legal systems and contract 
enforcement, grades and standards, market 
information) and capacity-building (farmer 
training, development of farmer organiza-
tions); and (f) facilitation of rural financial 
  - 3 - markets to promote smallholders’ ability to 
finance fertilizer purchases. 
 
There is much less agreement on short-run 
fertilizer promotion programs in general, 
and fertilizer subsidies in particular. It is 
not easy to find a type of program that 
dominates others when multiple objectives 
are pursued. These issues are illustrated in 
the discussion of programs that involve 
distribution of fertilizer and complemen-
tary inputs such as improved seed, where 
productivity gains can be achieved if the 
program focuses only on larger and more 
capitalized farmers, or where poor farmers 
can be reached through mass distribution 
but at the cost of lower productivity and 
inefficient targeting. 
 
While free or heavily subsidized input 
distribution programs in Africa are often 
motivated by the desire to address urgent 
problems of poverty or food security, the 
cure can be worse than the disease. Most 
such programs have proven to be costly, 
difficult to sustain, ineffective at targeting 
relatively poor farmers, subject to rent-
seeking, and harmful to development of 
sustainable input delivery systems. Small-
scale programs may avoid these problems, 
yet still not succeed in raising aggregate 
fertilizer use enough to have a significant 
impact on output or poverty alleviation.  
 
Subsidies may be warranted when there is 
a clear prospect of significant productivity 
gains (addressing economic growth 
objectives), when subsidies are a less 
costly form of income transfer than 
alternatives such as food aid (addressing 
poverty alleviation objectives), and/or 
when they can be designed in a way that 
promotes sustainable private sector 
involvement, or at least that avoids nega-
tive impacts on private markets. The 
challenge remains to determine whether 
these conditions are likely to be met in a 
given situation, and what the costs and 
returns are relative to alternatives. Policy 
and program choices should be based at 
least in part on local-level empirical 
analysis of likely impacts and their result-
ing costs and benefits. It is not enough to 
know the tradeoffs, i.e., types of benefits 
and costs, associated with alternatives. To 
decide among them also requires some 
estimate of the cost and benefit magni-
tudes. We need to move beyond story-
telling to more systematic evaluations of 
the private and social costs and benefits of 
different fertilizer promotion efforts. 
 
When undertaking these analyses, it is 
important to remember that increased 
fertilizer use should not be considered a 
goal in isolation. The broader goal is to 
ensure adequate soil fertility in order to 
support increased agricultural productivity, 
food security, and incomes. Inorganic 
fertilizer is one of many inputs needed to 
accomplish these broader goals, hence the 
systematic evaluations of private and 
social costs mentioned above must also 
include analyses of technologies and 
practices that complement and/or substi-
tute for inorganic fertilizers. 
 
*This Policy Synthesis is a condensed version of a 
longer, similarly named paper that is forthcoming 
as a World Bank Agriculture and Rural Develop-
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